Education Subsidies, Social Security and Growth: The Implications of a Demographic Shock
构建三期世代交叠模型，研究教育补贴和养老金的最优设计，发现最优路径上养老金作用较弱，教育补贴应部分由对退休者的一次性税收融资，并分析了婴儿潮-婴儿荒人口冲击下的政策调整。
We develop a three‐period overlapping‐generations model in which individual decisions about education are the engine of growth. In this setting, we investigate the normative role of education subsidies and old age pensions. Calibrating this model on empirical data, it is shown that the case for positive pension benefits is rather weak on the optimal path. An important part of education subsidies should be financed by lump‐sum taxes on retirees. We also examine how these transfers should be adjusted in the presence of a baby boom‐baby bust demographic shock. It turns out that an appropriate policy could be to increase education when the baby‐boom generation is at work. Labor productivity will then be higher when aging peaks so that the pension bill can be financed without reducing welfare for the baby‐bust generations.