Economic transition and the distribution of policy rents: The case of the wheat-flour-bread chain in Bulgaria
分析保加利亚1990年后农业食品链中政策租金的分配，发现零售商的超额利润部分源于转型期垄断行为和产品质量改进，但主要租金被面粉批发企业获取，且汇率间接转移显著影响结果。
Ivanova et al. (1994) calculate disaggregated PSE/CSE transfers between different stages of the agro-food chain in Bulgaria since 1990. Some of their results appear counter-intuitive, given the stylised facts. This note attempts to explain these results, using a more detailed study of the wheat-flour-bread chain. The first conclusion is that transitional excess profits and product quality improvements may explain part of the calculated transfers in favour of retailers, but that this explanation is insufficient. A second conclusion is that the large net transfers to 'retailers' are mostly rents collected by flour wholesale trading enterprises. A third conclusion is that transition business practices, including monopolistic and collusive behaviour in the agro-food chain, create rents which are not included in the calculated transfers. Fourth, including indirect transfers caused by exchange rates substantially affects the results. Finally, our analysis supports the previous conclusions on the inefficienyof Bulgarian policies