THE ROLE OF POWER AND POLITICS IN THE REPRICING OF EXECUTIVE OPTIONS.
研究了CEO权力如何影响高管期权的重新定价，发现期权行权价与股价的价差对重新定价可能性的影响在CEO兼任董事长时更强，而公司及CEO的可见度、董事会构成等因素会削弱这种影响。
We explore how CEO power affects the repricing of executive options. The spread between an option's exercise, or strike, price, and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing. This effect is enhanced when the CEO of the firm in question is also the chairman of its board. Firm and CEO visibility, more board members appointed after a CEO's hiring than before it, a staggered board, and relatively high percentages of CEO and institutional ownership reduce the impact of the spread on the likelihood of repricing.