Regulation of a Multi-Product Monopolist: Effects on Pricing and Bundling
研究对多产品垄断者的基本服务设定价格上限的规制如何影响其定价和捆绑决策，发现这种规制可能降低部分消费者价格但提高其他消费者价格，并可能导致社会次优的拆分销售。
This paper studies the effects on a multi-product monopolist's pricing and bundling decisions of a form of regulation in which a price-cap is imposed on only the basic level of service. Conditions are given under which the screening problem faced by the multi-product monopolist can be adequately represented in a one-dimensional screening model, and it is shown that this requires strong assumptions on preferences. In both a one-dimensional and a general multi-product screening model basic service price-caps may result in higher prices for some consumers even while lowering prices for other consumers. Socially suboptimal unbundling may be induced by such regulation in the general multi-product model. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.