Executive Option Repricing, Incentives, and Retention
研究公司是否允许重新定价高管期权的决定因素，以及该政策对高管离职和留任的影响。发现内部治理好、激励强或股东监督少的公司更可能保留重新定价灵活性；限制重新定价的公司股价下跌后高管自愿离职率更高。
ABSTRACT While many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced, other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing. This article investigates the determinants of firms' repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention. Firms that have better internal governance, that use more powerful stock‐based incentives, or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility. Firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines. When share price declines are severe, restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options.