Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation
研究在统一价格拍卖中，当竞拍者获得不完美信号且中标后需选择行动时，拍卖价格无法聚合信息，而其他市场统计量（如配给量或出价分布）包含额外信息。
We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z > k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions, there are symmetric equilibria where the auction price aggregates no information. Moreover, market statistics other than price (e.g., the amount of rationing or the bid distribution) contain extra information about the state. In contrast, in standard large auctions without actions, the price aggregates all relevant information.