Regulatory Uncertainty: A Reason to Postpone Investments? Not Necessarily
研究显示，在灵活且不确定性间断解决的监管环境下，企业未必推迟投资，而是出于获取竞争资源、利用互补资源和缓解制度压力等动机。基于德国电力行业案例，连接资源基础观与制度理论。
abstract There is a polarity in the literature as to whether companies do or do not postpone investment decisions in the light of regulatory uncertainty. In the case of flexible regulation characterized by a high degree and discontinuous resolution of uncertainty, we show that companies do not necessarily postpone investment decisions. We trace this observation back to three motivations: securing competitive resources, leveraging complementary resources, and alleviating institutional pressure. We connect these motivations to fundamental principles of the resource‐based view and institutional theory and further show the existence of a regime where institutionally motivated and resource‐based actions are not necessarily decoupled. We base our research on a case study covering 80 per cent of the German power generation industry which faces regulatory uncertainty from the European CO 2 Emission Trading Scheme.