The Role of Private Knowledge in Reducing the Information Wedge: A Research Note
利用英国企业信贷数据，研究发现银行放贷时，企业已有声誉比抵押品水平更重要；银行对高抵押品反应积极，对高信贷需求反应消极。
Abstract: In this first ever study to examine the marginal importance of collateral level vis‐à‐vis reputation in reducing information asymmetry, we find using unique data for UK business credit, that pre‐existing reputation is the single‐most important determinant in inducing a bank to extend a loan. Moreover, a bank responds positively to higher levels of collateral and negatively to higher credit requests. Similar to Cole (1998) , but controlling for collateral level, we find that it helps to have banked with the lender before. Non‐trivial information search costs imply an important role for reputation in extending credits.