Naturalised epistemology and economics
批判了自然化认识论对经济学的所谓新贡献，指出该概念并非全新、缺乏连贯意义，且无法为经济学指明创新方向，并讨论了其三个具体局限。
The relevance to economics of naturalised epistemology (also known as the naturalistic turn) from philosophy of science has recently been argued by economic methodologists, especially by D. Wade Hands (Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001). This concept is held by Hands to constitute part of the 'new economic methodology' that consists of the 'interpenetration of economics and science theory'. Contrary to Hands's case, naturalised epistemology is shown here not to represent a qualitatively new concept, to possess little coherent meaning, and to be incapable of charting an innovative way forward for economics. Although there are more issues concerning naturalism bearing on economics than are noted by Hands, three specific limitations of naturalised epistemology are discussed. These and other limitations are related to the economics examples Hands proposes suggesting the usefulness of naturalised epistemology for economics. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.