Involuntary Unemployment Relative to Simple Jobs in a Competitive Labor Market
解释了非自愿失业，区分有无企业特定技能的工人，并承认存在无需技能的简单工作。与现有文献不同，无技能工人失业是因为企业特定技能的培训成本，而非与生产率无关的成本。模型符合资历实践。
This paper accounts for involuntary unemployment, distinguishing between workers with and without the firm-specific skills and also recognizing the presence of simple jobs without skill requirements. By contrast to the current literature, and in particular the insider-outsider model, workers without the skills are unemployed in the paper (1) although their market is competitive; (2) not with regard to jobs and skill requirements, but simple jobs; and (3) not because of costs unrelated to productivity, but the training cost of the firm-specific skills, a cost intrinsic to productivity. The model in the paper accords well with the practice of bumping and seniority. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.