Wage Posting in Two‐Sided Search and the Minimum Wage
构建了一个均衡双边搜索模型，分析雇主在匹配异质性下通过设定工资获取市场力量，并解释最低工资调整对就业的矛盾性实证结果。
This article focuses on wage formation in an equilibrium (two‐sided) model of search with match‐specific heterogeneity. Despite a large number (a continuum) of employers, search provides sufficient isolation to generate market power. By posting wages, employers, without collusion, capture most of the surplus that accrues to any match. The equilibrium wage is below that which maximizes employment. An example, using calibrated parameter values, is used to reconcile some recent, otherwise contradictory empirical results on the employment effects of minimum wage adjustments.