Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case
研究了异质性零售商成功合谋的困难，并基于加拿大汽油卡特尔案例，揭示了通过价格调整延迟实现转移支付的合谋机制，估计了延迟带来的转移规模及其对减少背叛频率的作用。
We point out a fundamental difficulty of successfully colluding in retail markets with heterogeneous firms, and characterize the mechanism recent gasoline cartels in Canada used to sustain collusion. Heterogeneity in cost and network size necessitates arrangements whereby participants split the market unequally to favor stronger players. We characterize empirically the strategy and transfer mechanism using court documents containing summaries and extracts of conversations between participants. The mechanism implements transfers based on adjustment delays during price changes. We estimate that these delays can translate into substantial transfers and provide examples in which they can substantially reduce deviation frequency.