Estimating the Strategic Value of Long‐Term Forward Purchase Contracts Using Auction Models
展示如何用拍卖模型在资本预算中评估长期远期合同的战略价值，并以天然气照付不议合同为例说明，帮助管理者量化合同带来的议价优势。
ABSTRACT We demonstrate how an auction model can be used in a traditional capital budgeting context to assign a value to the strategic advantage of long‐term forward contracts. Research in the field of industrial organization has pointed to the danger of ex post opportunistic bargaining as a motivation for the use of forward contracts in natural resources and manufactured products, but no operational procedure exists for estimating the value secured by these contracts. Arbitrage methods for valuing forward contracts assume a competitive market in which the factors creating the bargaining problem and motivating the use of long‐term contracts are not present. Use of the model is illustrated in the case of take‐or‐pay contracts for natural gas.