Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
分析供应商先投资研发再竞标采购合同的情形，发现若买方能在投资前承诺采购机制，则递减规模报酬下第一价格和第二价格密封拍卖可唯一实现完全信息解；若机制与投资同时选择则无法实现，并讨论次优均衡合同如何随供应商数量变化。
We analyze a model in which potential suppliers invest in research and development (R & D) and then compete for a procurement contract from a buyer. If the buyer is able to commit to a procurement mechanism before the investment stage, the full-information solution can be uniquely implemented by first-price and second-price sealed-bid auction mechanisms when the R & D technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. If the procurement mechanisms and the levels of investment are chosen simultaneously, the full-information solution cannot be implemented. We discuss how the second-best equilibrium contract varies with the number of suppliers.