The Wealth Effects of Sale and Leasebacks: New Evidence
研究了售后回租作为企业重组组织架构的金融合约方式，发现初始回租期较短时卖方/承租人股东获得显著正回报，平均异常收益为1.3%。
This paper investigates the phenomenon of sale and leasebacks as one way in which firms may use financial contracts to rearrange their organizational architecture. A theoretic model links the length of initial leaseback period to incentives to make noncontractible future investments in the lease relationship and predicts that firms choose shorter leases when landlords make relatively important investments. Using a sample of 71 sale and leaseback events from the 1990s, we document a significant mean abnormal return of 1.3% for shareholders of seller/lessee firms announcing relatively short leasebacks. The evidence suggests that firms may use sale and leasebacks to optimize their claims to real estate.