Fulfilled Expectations of Entry
构建了一个两期模型，研究内生市场需求下消费者对未来市场结构的预期如何在均衡中实现，发现价格竞争下两种预期（双寡头或垄断）都能实现，而产量竞争下只有唯一均衡，且产量比价格更能阻止进入。
I develop a two-period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer's expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium. I find that both expectations (duopoly and monopoly) are fulfilled in the incumbent's price-setting game, while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity-setting game. I also find that quantity is more entry-deterring than price in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in the price-setting game is higher than or equal to that of the quantity-setting game.