Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
建模了选民和政党都关心不平等时的再分配选举政治，发现政党会采用比例所得税并辅以猪肉桶项目来争取高影响力群体中的摇摆选民，结果支持“迪雷克托定律”。
We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high “clout” groups, with disproportionately many “swing” voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to “Director's Law,” which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.