Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting
证明了一个两期股票市场经济中股东均衡的存在性，其中证券数量可能少于世界状态数，均衡通过股东投票和股票交易两种机制共同实现。
This paper demonstrates the existence of a shareholders' equilibrium for a two-period stock-market economy in which there may be fewer securities than states of the world. There are two allocation mechanisms in the economy: firms' owners may vote (direction restricted majority rule) to change firms' production plans across states while keeping shareholdings fixed, and individuals may trade their shares and stocks of a current production/consumption good while keeping firms' plans fixed. A shareholders' equilibrium is a set of firms' plans, and an allocation of shares and the current good which are stable with respect to both mechanisms. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.