SLOW DEVELOPMENT AND SPECIAL INTERESTS*
基于创新驱动增长理论，论证缓慢发展会促进特殊利益集团形成，并分析这些集团如何长期增加发展过程的波动性，但对发展只有暂时阻碍作用。
This article argues that a natural implication of an innovation‐based theory of growth is that slow development facilitates the formation of special interest groups. We demonstrate this in a growth model where innovations take the form of new goods and new production processes, and where factor suppliers in individual industries can organize to form rent‐extracting special interest groups. We then examine the effect these groups have on an economy's subsequent development. We find that these groups can retard an economy's development for extended periods, but not permanently. Their long‐run effect is to increase the volatility of the development process.