Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking
研究了高管团队中固定激励与可变激励的比例对企业后续风险承担的影响，发现固定激励比例越高，风险承担越低；股票期权正向影响风险承担，而持股则呈曲线关系。
Abstract In our work, the influences on subsequent firm risk taking of fixed incentives relative to variable incentives as well as the separate effects on subsequent corporate risk taking of variable incentives are examined. Focusing on the top management team members, we find a higher proportion of incentives that are devoted to fixed incentives relative to variable incentives tend to be inversely associated with subsequent firm risk taking. Managerial stock options are directly and uniformly associated with subsequent corporate risk taking. Executive shareholdings, however, display a curvilinear relationship with subsequent enterprise risk taking. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.