A THEORY OF WAGES AND LABOR DEMAND WITH INTRA‐FIRM BARGAINING AND MATCHING FRICTIONS*
构建了一个包含搜索摩擦和企业内部战略议价的劳动力市场均衡模型，给出了异质性劳动和资本下的显式闭式解，发现存在过度就业现象，并分析了不同群体议价能力差异对就业和资本投资的影响。
This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within‐firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold‐up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital.