Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets
通过三组实验室实验，检验理性预期理论预测：前两组（完全Arrow-Debreu证券交易或相同偏好）中双向拍卖有效聚合了分散信息并达到均衡，第三组失败表明市场制度与交易工具对均衡实现至关重要。
The idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization (Hurwicz, 1972) and rational expectations (Lucas, 1972). We report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations. In two of the three series (one in which participants trade a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities and a second in which all participants have identical preferences), double auction trading leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium. Failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium.