Governing buyer–supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China
基于经济和社会交换理论，研究交易机制和关系机制在抑制机会主义和提升关系绩效中的不同作用，发现交易机制更有效抑制机会主义，关系机制更有效提升绩效，且两者联合使用效果更佳。
Abstract Building on economic and social exchange theories, this study investigates the different roles transactional and relational mechanisms have in hindering opportunism and improving relationship performance in an emerging economy. Our study applied to manufacturer–distributor dyads in China and used matched survey data (225 paired sample firms) to test our hypotheses. Our hierarchical multivariate regression and semipartial correlation analyses suggest that transactional mechanisms are more effective in restraining opportunism while relational mechanisms are more powerful in improving relationship performance. This performance is improved more significantly when both contracts and relational norms are used jointly than when used separately. Likewise, opportunism is curbed more effectively when both contracts and trust are used jointly than when used individually.