Agricultural Support Policies in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: Why Market Power Matters in Policy Design
研究发现，当市场存在寡头或寡头买方力量时，传统农业支持政策（如价格下限和差额补贴）的福利效果可能被削弱甚至逆转，政府实施成本也会增加，因此政策设计必须考虑市场力量。
Most agricultural policy analysis assumes that markets are perfectly competitive, despite increasing evidence to the contrary. We demonstrate that the interaction of market power and government intervention may lead to outcomes that are counter to key results of policy analysis for perfectly competitive markets. We show that market power may reduce or eliminate entirely the net welfare benefits from removing two traditional support mechanisms, price floors and deficiency payments, and may increase considerably the government's cost of implementing either of them. Accordingly, optimally designed price support measures may improve welfare in the presence of downstream oligopoly and/or oligopsony power.