Debt and Input Misallocation
研究债务融资如何影响企业高效使用投入要素的激励，提出估算这类代理成本的方法，并应用于航空运输业，发现债务增加会降低效率，部分原因是杠杆企业更多使用可监控和可抵押的投入要素。
ABSTRACT We investigate a class of agency costs of debt that arise because debt financing affects the firm's incentives to use inputs efficiently. A methodology for estimating this class of costs is presented and applied to a major industry, air transport. Our results are consistent with agency models that predict a decrease in efficiency as the debt increases. A part of the loss of efficiency that we identify is attributable to the greater use by levered firms of inputs that can be monitored and are collateralizable.