The political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of India: An empirical investigation
利用印度14个主要邦的数据，研究发现选举年邦政府会减少商品税收入、降低经常性支出并增加资本性发展支出，且联合政府比单一政府征收更少的非税收入并减少经常性支出。
Abstract Using data from the 14 major states of India, we investigate whether state governments' fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations. Our principal findings are twofold. First, we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles: state governments raise less commodity tax revenue, spend less on the current account, and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years. Second, we show that coalition state governments raise less own non-tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition. In sum, the dispersion of political power affects government size.