Underwriting and Calls of Convertible Bonds*
研究了信息不对称下可转换债券的赎回决策，发现承销传递负面信息，导致承销赎回的股价跌幅更大、赎回更早且转换期权更浅实值，承销佣金与股价跌幅负相关。
We model convertible bond calls under asymmetric information where, unlike Harris and Raviv (1985), we consider a nonzero call price and a call notice period. In the model, the use of underwriters conveys negative information. Consequently, the stock price decline is greater for underwritten calls than for nonunderwritten calls. Furthermore, underwritten calls are made earlier and when the conversion option is less deep in the money. Underwriting commissions and the stock price decline associated with a call are negatively related to the extent that the conversion option is in the money before the call. Empirical evidence in this paper and Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) are consistent with the model's predictions.