Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions
放松独立私人价值假设，在更广泛的拍卖类别中刻画最优保留价，发现当竞拍者信息相关时，随着人数增加，卖家的最优保留价会快速收敛到其真实价值。
The risk-neutral independent-private-values (IPV) auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices: no matter how many bidders, the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value. This is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution, and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice. We relax the IPV assumption, characterise optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions, and show that when information is correlated the seller's optimal reservation price converges to his true value, often monotonically and rapidly, as the number of bidders grows.