Quality Disclosure Formats in a Distribution Channel
研究制造商直接向消费者披露质量信息或通过下游零售商间接披露的两种格式，发现零售披露能带来更多信息揭示，并分析了制造商选择不同披露格式的条件。
Firms normally disclose quality information to consumers using two alternative formats: either directly to consumers or indirectly through downstream retailers. This study investigates optimal disclosure strategies/formats in a channel setting with bilateral monopolies. It shows that retail disclosure leads to more equilibrium information revelation. This is because the manufacturer can, through wholesale price cuts, partially absorb the retailer's effective disclosure cost and thus increase the retailer's incentive for disclosure. The conditions under which a particular disclosure format arises as the manufacturer's optimal choice are also examined. Even though direct disclosure is the ex post dominated option, the manufacturer may benefit from committing ex ante to the direct disclosure format when the cost of disclosure is sufficiently high.