A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing
证明，在销售人员效用和销售结果分布的特定假设下，最优薪酬是达成销售定额后的一次性高额奖金；即使放宽风险中性假设，结论依然成立，对有限责任和专用技能下的道德风险问题有启示。
Sales quotas are a fixture of sales compensation plans and are often associated with a significant discrete bonus. This paper shows that, under certain assumptions about salesperson utility and the distribution of sales outcomes, the optimal compensation is a discrete bonus for meeting a sales quota. The results are similar when the assumption of agent risk neutrality is relaxed. The model has implications for many moral hazard problems where the agent has a liability limitation and job-specific skill. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.