Multidimensional Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
研究买方拥有私人边际估值信息时，与卖方就价格和数量进行谈判的均衡结果，发现高估值买方可能选择揭示或隐藏信息，低估值买方会购买低于有效数量的商品，且当报价间隔趋近于零时，数量扭曲是唯一持续的效率损失。
A buyer with private information regarding marginal valuation bargains with a seller to determine price and quantity of trade. Depending on parameter values, a high‐valuation buyer wants either to reveal information to create value or to conceal it to capture value. In the first case, equilibrium trades are efficient. In the second case, the low‐valuation buyer purchases less than her efficient quantity, and there can be a one‐period delay in trade. The quantity distortion is the only inefficiency that persists when time between offers approaches zero. There exist equilibria that are independent of the seller's prior beliefs.