Convergence in Economic Models with Bayesian Hierarchies of Beliefs
研究当代理人拥有关于他人信念的信念（信念层次）时，最优行为收敛到纳什均衡的条件，即最佳反应映射的压缩性和信念的相互绝对连续性，违反这些条件可能导致任意行为或循环行为。
I study a model where hierarchies of beliefs (the beliefs about the beliefs of other agents, etc.) are important. I provide conditions under which optimal actions of agents will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the model characterized by the true, previously unknown “fundamentals.” The conditions are (i) a contraction property on the best-response mappings and (ii) a mutual absolute continuity condition on beliefs. Violation of (i) may result in an “anything is possible” result: any stochastic process of actions is consistent with maximizing behavior and Bayesian updating. Violation of (ii) may result in cyclical behavior of actions on each sample path.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C73, D81, D82, D83, D84.