Corporate Investment Decisions and Corporate Control: Evidence from Going-Private Transactions
研究公司在被私有化前五年的投资决策，发现私有化候选公司的新投资公告伴随显著负异常回报，尤其在争议交易中，投资决策的财富效应与成为收购目标的可能性负相关，表明私有化可减少因不良投资产生的代理成本。
The investment decisions of firms over a five-year period immediately prior to being taken private are examined. The results indicate that announcements of new investments made by going-private candidates are characterized by significant negative median abnormal returns. These findings appear to be driven largely by the subsample of contested transactions. For this subsample and its control group, the likelihood of becoming a buyout candidate is significantly inversely related to the wealth effects of the firm's investment decisions. Overall, the results suggest that one source of value in going-private transactions, particularly contested transactions, is the reduction of agency costs observed in the form of poor investment decisions.