Coalition Formation in a Five-Person Market Game
通过11组五人学生实验，测试六种市场博弈中联盟形成行为，检验四种解概念的描述力，发现联盟顺序形成、最大份额结构等是主要决定因素。
Market games constitute a class of cooperative n-person games with sidepayments in which several coalitions may form simultaneously. In order to study coalition forming behavior in such games and to test the descriptive power of four major solution concepts that yield differing prescriptions for market games, 11 pentads of students each played 6 different market games presented in characteristic function form through a computer-controlled experimental procedure. The outcomes showed strong consistencies over pentads and sharp differences among games. None of the models fully accounted for these data. Instead, considerations of sequential formation of coalitions within a coalition structure, the concept of maximal share structure suggested in the equal share solution, and a recently developed model, that encompasses the predictions of the bargaining set and equal shares, served jointly as the first-order determinants of both the decision of which coalition to form and the allocation of payoff to coalition members.