Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives and Job Design*
研究了当承诺有限且代理人有多项任务和职业关切时，最优激励合同的设计，发现对临近退休的代理人应给予最强显性激励，且职业关切可能降低福利。
Abstract We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent's career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the principal might want to give the strongest explicit incentives to agents far from retirement to account for the fact that career concerns might induce behavior in conflict with the principal's preferences. Furthermore, we show that maximized welfare might be decreasing in the strength of career concerns, that optimal incentives can be positively correlated with various measures of uncertainty, and that career incentives have strong implications for optimal job design.