Post-Keynesianism, socialisation of investment and Swedish wage-earner funds
分析了瑞典工资收入者基金这一争议性经济政策实验，发现其财务表现良好但民主化效果有限，宏观经济影响受限于规模，最终被资产价格泡沫崩溃所淹没。
This paper analyses the performance of one of the most controversial of recent economic policy 'experiments', namely Swedish Wage-earner Funds (WEFs). It examines the ability of the WEFs to meet macroeconomic, financial and democratic objectives. The analysis indicates a favourable financial performance, but little significant democratisation. Macroeconomic influence was constrained by the limited size of the scheme and, though associated with positive changes in economic variables, the experiment was ultimately overwhelmed by the collapse of an asset price 'bubble'. Nevertheless, the performance of the WEFs has legitimised the concept of collective investment funds as an economic policy instrument. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.