房地产贷款模型中的逆向选择

Adverse Selection in a Model of Real Estate Lending

Journal of Finance · 1989
被引 58
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

解释抵押贷款合同中为何存在“点数”,认为在劳动收入保险缺失且法律禁止提前还款罚金时,点数可充当罚金,并分析了利率不依赖贷款规模时点数的使用。

Abstract

ABSTRACT We provide a rationale for the presence of points in mortgage loan contracts. Our analysis builds on two key features. First, insurance markets are unavailable for labor income. Second, the “due‐on‐sale” clause allows banks to offer loan contracts which partially insure against fluctuations in labor income. If explicit prepayment penalties are prohibited by law, points serve effectively as prepayment penalties. We also examine environments where such penalties are not prohibited and show that points will be used if interest rates cannot depend on the size of the loan.

抵押贷款提前还款罚金点数逆向选择