Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation
通过三项实验研究，发现弱制裁系统比无制裁系统更降低合作，原因是制裁改变了人们对决策类型的认知（从伦理决策转为商业决策），并提出了信号效应与处理效应的理论模型。
Three studies are used to examine how surveillance and sanctioning systems affect cooperative behavior in dilemma situations. The first two studies demonstrate that a weak sanctioning system results in less cooperation than no sanctioning system; furthermore, results from the second study suggest that sanctions affect the type of decision people perceive they are making, prompting them to see it as a business rather than an ethical decision. The results from these studies are used to develop a theoretical model that postulates that the relationship between sanctions and cooperation is due to both a signaling effect, in which sanctions influence the type of decision that is perceived to be made, and a processing effect, in which the decision processing, including whether or not the strength of the sanction is considered, depends on the decision frame evoked. A third study provides support for the processing-effect hypothesis.