Standardization in Decentralized Economies
用演化博弈模型分析去中心化经济中标准如何自发形成，发现人们对不兼容的态度决定标准化结果：厌恶不兼容时可能锁定劣标准，需要干预；容忍或中立时无路径依赖，自由放任更优。
This paper presents a dynamic model, inspired by evolutionary game theory, of how standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies. It shows that standardization outcomes depend on adopters' attitudes to problems caused by incompatibility. If individuals display aversion to incompatibility, standardization never fails to happen eventually, but societies sometimes end up picking inferior standards. In this case, official action can be useful to quickly achieve sensible standardization. On the other hand, when individuals display tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility, there is neither path-dependency nor a lock-in problem, and regulation seems a poor alternative to laissez-faire.