Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard
研究了道德风险如何影响两个代理人各自选择项目风险和努力水平，并通过转移支付分担风险，发现投资风险的可观测性对风险承担的影响至关重要，而转移支付的影响更依赖于效用函数。
This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact on transfers is much more utility dependent.