名义合同与货币政策目标:滑向指数化

Nominal Contracting and Monetary Targets – Drifting into Indexation

Economic Journal · 2002
被引 26
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

从家庭风险分散角度为名义工资合同提供理论依据,通过校准的一般均衡模型发现,当生产率和货币冲击均为暂时性时,最优工资合同几乎全是名义的。模型表明,货币冲击的持续性会降低福利,建议央行重新审视其操作。

Abstract

We look for a theoretical justification of nominal wage contracts in household diversification of risk. In a calibrated general equilibrium model we find from stochastic simulation that if both productivity and monetary shocks are temporary then optimal wage contracts are overwhelmingly nominal. The model suggests that the persistence in monetary shocks not only raises wage protection but also reduces welfare in a world where productivity shocks are persistent, as both theory and our empirical results for the OCED suggest they are. This suggests that this central bank practice is due for review.

名义工资合同货币冲击指数化风险分散