Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
证明，在机制设计中，私人信息带来的租金并非必然导致效率扭曲，其根源在于信息独立分布的假设。作者分析了广泛机制设计游戏中的租金提取，给出了租金可任意小的充要条件，并展示了两人讨价还价和Milgrom-Weber拍卖在特定条件下可实现高效或完全租金提取。
In models of asymmetric information, possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors. This induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency. The authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed. Rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed, and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided. Additionally, the two-person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first-order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition. Similar conditions allow full rent extraction in Milgrom-Weber auctions.