Social Insurance with In‐kind Provision of Private Goods
研究了在社保体系中，通过向残疾人提供特定实物商品（而非现金）来筛选受益者、实现收入再分配的最优政策，并探讨了能否用收入测试或非线性定价替代。
This paper addresses the desirability of providing in‐kind transfers as a screening device to facilitate redistribution of income from able to disabled persons within a social insurance system. An optimal policy—consisting of cash transfers, income‐contingent in‐kind transfers of one good particularly demanded by disabled workers, and linear taxation of other commodities—is characterized. It is then asked whether and, if so, when this policy can be replaced by an “earning‐tested scheme” that provides the in‐kind good only to those indivi duals who have no earnings from labor or by a non‐linear pricing policy.