Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
分析了一个多产品垄断者在面对不确定需求时，通过拍卖机制销售产品，并研究其捆绑决策对买方福利和市场效率的影响。
This paper analyzes bundling decisions of a rnultiproduct monopolist facing uncertain \ndemand. The monopolist sells his products using an auction mechanism and the market is \nanalyzed as a game with incomplete information in which the buyers as well as the seller \nare strategic agents. With a small number of buyers, a profit maximizing seller will bundle \nall his output. This makes buyers uniformly worse off compared to the case where the same \nmonopolist does not bundle, in the sense that any buyer is worse off regardless of his \ndemand for the monopolist's outputs. With a larger number of buyers, the seller will have a \ntendency to unbundle his output and "high-demand" buyers are worse off than they would \nbe if the monopolist bundled his output. "Low-demand" buyers. on the other hand. are \nalways better off when the monopolist unbundles his output, regardless of the number of \ncompeting buyers. Despite the fact that "high demand" buyers are the typical purchasers \nof the monopolist's output, the net effect of increasing the number of buyers is greater \nmarket efficiency since bundling creates market inefficiencies both ex post and ex ante.