An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
提出一种升价拍卖机制，在多个相同单位出售且竞拍者具有相互依赖估值和向下倾斜需求时实现有效结果，扩展了Ausubel（2004）的拍卖，并得到与Perry和Reny（2002）的密封投标拍卖相同的结果。
We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel's (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny's (2002) generalization of Vickrey's (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction. Bidders are permitted both to express different demands against different bidders, as well as to increase their demands. The equilibrium strategies are closely related to the familiar "drop out when price equals value" strategy of the English auction. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.