Accounting and Stock Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements
研究意外业绩对CEO薪酬的长期影响，发现意外好的会计业绩短期增加薪酬但长期无显著净收益，而意外好的股价表现则带来持续且显著的薪酬增长。
In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.