Empirical relevance of efficient contract theory: inter-firm contracts
整合风险分担、委托代理、交易成本、不完全契约和关系契约等理论，提出11个可检验假说，并对照特许经营、分成制、分包等领域的计量与案例证据，检验企业间契约理论的经验有效性。
Although there has been enormous development of the theory of efficient contracts in the last 20 years, empirical tests were slow to come. However, over the last 10 years, a considerable body of evidence has accumulated, particularly in relation to contracts between firms. This paper develops a simple, integrated theoretical framework to illustrate 11 testable hypotheses. The contract theories covered include risk sharing, principal-agent incentive models, transaction cost and incomplete contract models with specific investment, and the theory of relational contracting. The problems associated with empirical work on contracts are discussed before setting the hypotheses against a wide range of econometric and other empirical evidence (including work on franchising, sharecropping, subcontracting, contract duration, private institutions, experimental evidence, and a wide range of case studies).