On Optimal Competitive Contracting
通过一个风险中性的招标方和投标方例子，说明招标方从拍卖低效合同中获得的预期收入可能高于高效合同，原因在于低效合同中中标者预期利润下降快于产出价值下降。
We present an example of risk neutral bid-taker and bidders in which the bid-taker obtains a greater expected revenue from auctioning an inefficient contract than from auctioning an efficient contract. This occurs because in going from the efficient contract to an inefficient (but almost efficient) contract, the winning bidder's expected profit decreases faster than the value of the output produced under the contract (net of production costs) decreases. Therefore, the bid-taker's expected revenue—the value of the output less the winning bidder's expected profit—increases. The competitive letting of a contract introduces a factor not present when somehow letting a contract noncompetitively. In particular, changing the contract not only affects the efficiency of the contract, but also affects the amount of the contract's value that will be captured by the contract winner as profit. Therefore, for competitively let contracts, the optimal contract for the bid-taker to offer turns out less efficient than can be explained solely by any benefits from risk sharing.