Dynamic Price Competition, Briefly Sunk Costs, and Entry Deterrence
研究在短暂沉没成本的自然垄断中，进入威胁如何约束定价行为。模型显示，即使沉没成本短暂到不赋予在位者战略优势，进入威胁对价格的约束也很弱；在微小成本不对称下，低成本企业垄断是唯一均衡。
This article examines how the threat of entry constrains pricing behavior in a natural monopoly with briefly sunk costs. In the model of dynamic price competition explored here, costs are too briefly sunk to confer any strategic advantage to incumbency. Despite the lack of advantage to incumbency, the threat of entry exerts little discipline on prices. In the presence of a slight cost asymmetry, monopoly for the lower-cost firm is the unique equilibrium, regardless of which firm is initially the incumbent.