The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic change
研究了董事会资本（董事人力与社会资本的广度与深度）如何影响企业战略变革，并考察CEO权力对两者关系的调节作用。基于资源依赖理论，发现董事会资本广度促进战略变革，深度则抑制，CEO权力的调节作用得到部分支持。
Abstract We develop the construct of board capital, composed of the breadth and depth of directors' human and social capital, and explore how board capital affects strategic change. Building upon resource dependence theory, we submit that board capital breadth leads to more strategic change, while board capital depth leads to less. We also recognize CEO power as a moderator of these relationships. Our hypotheses are tested using a random sample of firms on the S&P 500. We find support for the effect of board capital on strategic change, and partial support for the moderating effect of CEO power. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.